Soft budget constraints and the property rights theory of ownership

被引：8
|
作者：
Eggleston, Karen [1 ]
机构：
[1] Stanford Univ, Walter H Shorenstein Asia Pacific Res Ctr, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2008年 / 100卷 / 03期
关键词：
contracting; ownership; soft budget constraint; commitment problem;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.010
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Modeling the government make-or-buy decision, Hart and colleagues [Hart, C., Shleifer, S. and Vishny, R-W., 1997, The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons, Quarterly journal of Economics 112, 1127-1161] assume government providers are exogenously more replaceable than private providers. Instead, we posit government managers' soft incentives arise endogenously from their lack of control rights, because of rationally softer budget constraints. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：425 / 427
页数：3
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