Geoengineering, moral hazard, and trust in climate science: evidence from a survey experiment in Britain

被引:39
|
作者
Fairbrother, Malcolm [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bristol, Bristol, Avon, England
关键词
PERCEPTIONS; POLITICS; EARTH;
D O I
10.1007/s10584-016-1818-7
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Geoengineering could be taken by the public as a way of dealing with climate change without reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This paper presents the results of survey experiments testing whether hearing about solar radiation management (SRM) affects people's support for taxing polluting energy and/or their trust in climate science. For a nationally representative sample of respondents in Britain, I found that receiving a brief introduction to SRM had no impact on most people's willingness to pay taxes, nor on their trust in climate science. Hearing about this form of geoengineering therefore appears unlikely to erode support for emissions reductions. Specifically for political conservatives asked first about paying taxes, moreover, hearing about SRM increased trust in climate science. These and other results of the experiments also provide partial support for the theory that conservatives' lower trust in climate science generally stems from their aversion to regulatory action by the state.
引用
收藏
页码:477 / 489
页数:13
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