Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment

被引：0
|
作者：
Saak, Alexander E. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Int Food Policy Res Inst, Markets Trade & Inst Div, Washington, DC 20006 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2015年 / 136卷
关键词：
Moral hazard; Teams; Endogenous team size; Private monitoring; Quality; REPUTATION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.014
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static model where the buyer has private information about quality, sellers have private information about the cost and choice of effort, and quality is not contractible. (C) 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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页码：88 / 91
页数：4
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