The first-order approach to the principal-agent problems under inequality aversion

被引：10
|
作者：
Cato, Susumu [1 ]
机构：
[1] Tokyo Metropolitan Univ, Grad Sch Social Sci, Hachioji, Tokyo 1920397, Japan
来源：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2013年 / 41卷 / 05期
关键词：
Moral hazard; Inequality aversion; First-order approach; Behavioral contract theory; MORAL HAZARD; PREFERENCES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.orl.2013.06.012
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
This paper considers the principal agent problems under inequality aversion. We identify sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to be valid. Our results suggest that the first-order approach is restricted in the presence of inequality aversion. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：526 / 529
页数：4
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