CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE, CRIME, AND POLICE INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984

被引：4
|
作者：
Kantor, Shawn [1 ,2 ]
Kitchens, Carl T. [3 ]
Pawlowski, Steven [4 ]
机构：
[1] Florida State Univ, Dept Econ, Econ Prosper & Individual Opportun, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
[2] Florida State Univ, Dept Econ, NBER, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
[3] Florida State Univ, Dept Econ, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
[4] New York City Dept Finance, New York, NY 10038 USA
来源：
ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 2021年 / 59卷 / 01期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
ENFORCEMENT; ACCIDENTS; TICKETS; RATES; 1990S; RIOTS; CITY; WAR;
D O I：
10.1111/ecin.12952
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The 1984 federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA) included a provision that permitted local law enforcement agencies to acquire up to 80% of the proceeds derived from civil asset forfeitures obtained in joint operations with federal authorities. We investigate how this rule governing forfeited assets influenced crime and police incentives by taking advantage of pre-existing differences in state-level civil asset forfeiture law and the timing of the CCCA. We find that after the CCCA was enacted crime fell about 17% in places where the federal law allowed police to retain more of their seized assets than state law previously allowed.(JELK42, K15, H76)
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页码：217 / 242
页数：26
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