CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities

被引：37

作者：

Bouslah, Kais ^{[1
]}

Linares-Zegarra, Jose ^{[2
]}

M'Zali, Bouchra ^{[3
]}

Scholtens, Bert ^{[4
,5
]}

机构：

[1] Univ St Andrews, Sch Management, Ctr Responsible Banking & Finance, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland

[2] Univ Essex, Essex Business Sch, Colchester, Essex, England

[3] Univ Quebec Montreal, Ecole Sci Gest, AICRI, CRSDD ESG UQAM, Quebec City, PQ, Canada

[4] Univ St Andrews, Sch Management, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland

[5] Univ Groningen, Fac Econ & Business, Groningen, Netherlands

来源：

BRITISH ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2018年 / 50卷 / 01期

关键词：

Executive compensation; CEO risk-taking incentives; Socially irresponsible activities; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; RESPONSIBILITY; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; IMPACT; REPUTATION; RESPOND; WEALTH; COSTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.bar.2017.05.004

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives, measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth held in options to a change in stock return volatility or Vega, and socially irresponsible activities using a large sample of U.S. firms during the period 1992-2012. Our results for the period before the 2007 financial crisis suggest that CEO risk taking incentives are positively related to socially irresponsible activities. In addition, we find that a firm's socially responsible actions may act as a moderator, strengthening the aforementioned relationship. The results after the 2007 financial crisis show no evidence of a significant relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities. This could be due to the increased scrutiny regarding compensation packages and the increased role of reputational issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our results suggest that risk-taking incentives embedded in the CEO compensation scheme have implications for corporate policies toward socially irresponsible activities. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：76 / 92

页数：17

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