First price auctions with resale

被引:48
|
作者
Gupta, M
Lebrun, B
机构
[1] Univ Laval, Dept Econ, St Foy, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada
[2] Northwestern Univ, JL Kellogg Grad Sch Management, Dept Managerial Econ & Decis Sci, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
关键词
asymmetry; first price auction; resale;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00063-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We present a simple model of first price auction with two bidders whose valuations are not identically distributed and where resale is possible between the bidders and given an explicit expression for the equilibrium strategies. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:181 / 185
页数:5
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