Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects
被引:1
|
作者:
Sher, Shlomi
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Pomona Coll, Dept Psychol Sci, Claremont, CA 91711 USAPomona Coll, Dept Psychol Sci, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
Sher, Shlomi
[1
]
McKenzie, Craig R. M.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Psychol, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, La Jolla, CA 92093 USAPomona Coll, Dept Psychol Sci, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
McKenzie, Craig R. M.
[2
,3
]
机构:
[1] Pomona Coll, Dept Psychol Sci, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
[2] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Psychol, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[3] Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermudez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.
机构:
FGV, Escola Brasileira Econ & Financas, EPGE, Praia Botafogo 190, BR-22250900 Rio De Janeiro, RJ, BrazilFGV, Escola Brasileira Econ & Financas, EPGE, Praia Botafogo 190, BR-22250900 Rio De Janeiro, RJ, Brazil
机构:
Univ Paris Saclay, CNRS, HEC Paris, GREGHEC, 1 Rue Liberat, F-78351 Jouy En Josas, FranceUniv Paris Saclay, CNRS, HEC Paris, GREGHEC, 1 Rue Liberat, F-78351 Jouy En Josas, France