Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects

被引：1
|
作者：
Sher, Shlomi [1 ]
McKenzie, Craig R. M. [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Pomona Coll, Dept Psychol Sci, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
[2] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Psychol, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[3] Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
来源：
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES | 2022年 / 45卷
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
D O I：
10.1017/S0140525X2200111X
中图分类号：
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号：
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要：
The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermudez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.
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