In a dynamic optimisation framework we show that the optimal tax evasion can be either a positive or a negative function of the tax rate according to the form of the fine to be paid when evasion is detected. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Resources Future Inc, Washington, DC 20036 USA
Cheung Kong Grad Sch Business, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaResources Future Inc, Washington, DC 20036 USA
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Tokyo Inst Technol, Sch Engn, Dept Ind Engn & Econ, 2-12-1 Ookayama,Meguro ku, Tokyo 1528552, JapanTokyo Inst Technol, Sch Engn, Dept Ind Engn & Econ, 2-12-1 Ookayama,Meguro ku, Tokyo 1528552, Japan
Hori, Takeo
Maebayashi, Noritaka
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Univ Kitakyushu, Fac Econ & Business Adm, 4-2-1 Kitagata Kokura,Minami Ku, Kitakyushu, Fukuoka 8028577, JapanTokyo Inst Technol, Sch Engn, Dept Ind Engn & Econ, 2-12-1 Ookayama,Meguro ku, Tokyo 1528552, Japan
Maebayashi, Noritaka
Morimoto, Keiichi
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Meiji Univ, Sch Polit Sci & Econ, 1-1 Kanda Surugadai,Chiyoda ku, Tokyo 1018301, JapanTokyo Inst Technol, Sch Engn, Dept Ind Engn & Econ, 2-12-1 Ookayama,Meguro ku, Tokyo 1528552, Japan