FANNIE, FREDDIE, AND FAIRNESS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL CONSERVATORS

被引:0
|
作者
Steele, Ally Coll [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Law Sch, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the federal government assumed control of the government-sponsored mortgage entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This Note analyzes the "net worth sweep" amendment subsequently entered into by the Treasury Department and the Federal Housing and Finance Agency. The Note argues that the amendment provides an example of why shareholder derivative lawsuits can provide a critical check on executive agency action when the government takes over failing financial institutions.
引用
收藏
页码:417 / 445
页数:29
相关论文
共 50 条