The republican virtues of the "new commonwealth model of constitutionalism"

Based on a republican theory of democracy as equally shared popular control, dralyll from Philip Pettit 's recent work, this article argues in favor of the "new commonwealth model of constitutionalism" practiced in Canada, the UK, and elsewhere. It claims that the emphasis that the new commonwealth model places on political agents in the rights-related dimensions of the legislative process corresponds with the republican account of rights as political claims but also that the constricted role played by judges tinder the model answers to a number of important republican concerns around contestation and the dispersal of power In particular the article argues that the role of judges under the model can be understood as contributing to the gradual emergence of TIOrinS that are "commonly avowable" or shareable, and to the refining of those not over time, such that it enhances the control exercised by citizens over government. In this way the role of judges under the model in contrast to that under outright legal constitutionalism can be undei-stood as enhancing democracy, where democra T is understood in tins republican way.