Acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation: Are they good deals?

被引：139
|
作者：
Fu, Fangjian [1 ]
Lin, Leming [2 ]
Officer, Micah S. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Singapore Management Univ, Lee Kong Chian Sch Business, Singapore 178899, Singapore
[2] Univ Florida, Warrington Coll Business Adm, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA
[3] Loyola Marymount Univ, Coll Business Adm, Hilton Ctr Business, Los Angeles, CA 90045 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 109卷 / 01期
关键词：
Mergers and acquisitions; Stock overvaluation; Operating performance; Agency costs; CEO compensation; OPERATING PERFORMANCE; AGENCY COSTS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; MARKET VALUATION; ACQUIRERS; TAKEOVER; RETURNS; MERGERS; WEALTH;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.013
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Theory and recent evidence suggest that overvalued firms can create value for shareholders if they exploit their overvaluation by using their stock as currency to purchase less overvalued firms. We challenge this idea and show that, in practice, overvalued acquirers significantly overpay for their targets. These acquisitions do not, in turn, lead to synergy gains. Moreover, these acquisitions seem to be concentrated among acquirers with the largest governance problems. CEO compensation, not shareholder value creation, appears to be the main motive behind acquisitions by overvalued acquirers. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：24 / 39
页数：16
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