Do Judges' Delegations Affect Judicial Performance? A Transition Economy Evidence

被引:5
|
作者
Staszkiewicz, Piotr [1 ]
Morawska, Sylwia [1 ]
Banasik, Przemyslaw [2 ]
Witkowski, Bartosz [3 ]
Staszkiewicz, Richard [4 ]
机构
[1] Warsaw Sch Econ, Coll Corp Sci, Al Niepodleglosci 162, PL-02554 Warsaw, Poland
[2] Gdansk Univ Technol, Fac Management & Econ, Gdansk, Poland
[3] Warsaw Sch Econ, Coll Econ Anal, Warsaw, Poland
[4] Warsaw Univ Technol, Fac Elect & Informat Technol, Warsaw, Poland
关键词
Poland; efficiency; transition economy; delegation; political impact; judge’ s independence;
D O I
10.1080/0098261X.2020.1843092
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The aim of this study is to discern whether, by delegating judges from the court to the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Justice influences the results of courts in terms of adjudication. The study used a unique set of data for the Polish judicial system over a period of five years. The research results indicate that there are three reasons for delegating judges. Firstly, the delegation system serves to fill staff shortages among administrative staff at the Ministry of Justice. Secondly, the delegation system allows for inefficient judges to be moved. Thirdly, the system serves as an indirect control mechanism affecting the independence of courts. The results show that delegation has a positive short-term impact on judicial performance.
引用
收藏
页码:344 / 359
页数:16
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