Poland;
efficiency;
transition economy;
delegation;
political impact;
judge’
s independence;
D O I:
10.1080/0098261X.2020.1843092
中图分类号:
D9 [法律];
DF [法律];
学科分类号:
0301 ;
摘要:
The aim of this study is to discern whether, by delegating judges from the court to the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Justice influences the results of courts in terms of adjudication. The study used a unique set of data for the Polish judicial system over a period of five years. The research results indicate that there are three reasons for delegating judges. Firstly, the delegation system serves to fill staff shortages among administrative staff at the Ministry of Justice. Secondly, the delegation system allows for inefficient judges to be moved. Thirdly, the system serves as an indirect control mechanism affecting the independence of courts. The results show that delegation has a positive short-term impact on judicial performance.
机构:
Dongling School of Economics and Management, University of Science and TechnologyDongling School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology
Weixing Cai
Cheng(Colin) Zeng
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:Dongling School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology
机构:
Univ Sci & Technol Beijing, Dongling Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaUniv Sci & Technol Beijing, Dongling Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China
Cai, Weixing
Zeng, Cheng
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, EnglandUniv Sci & Technol Beijing, Dongling Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China