Research On Invite Bid Models Of Public Projects Invested By Government Based On Principal-Agent Theory

被引：0
|
作者：
Wang Lin-xiu [1 ,2 ]
Xie-lei [3 ]
机构：
[1] China Univ Min & Technol, Sch Management, Xuzhou, Peoples R China
[2] China Univ Min & Technol, Sch Architecture & Civil Engn, Xuzhou, Peoples R China
[3] Southeast Univ, Sch Civil Engn, Nanjing, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, INNOVATION MANAGEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, VOL II | 2008年
关键词：
D O I：
10.1109/ICIII.2008.266
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In accordance with the public projects invested by government based on principal-agent under Asymmetric Information, analyzing the issue of choosing the authorized company, an operable model on invite-bidding was built by making use of the Deuel illegal, Analytical Hierarchy Process and Mathematics Synthetic Judgment Method. Through the analysis of Model Extremes, It can provide some decided references for the client (the government) in deciding Project Consultation Company.
引用
收藏
页码：443 / +
页数：2
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