Commitment for storable goods under vertical integration

被引：22
|
作者：
Nie, Pu-yan [1 ]
机构：
[1] Jinan Univ, Inst Ind Econ, Guangzhou 510632, Guangdong, Peoples R China
来源：
ECONOMIC MODELLING | 2009年 / 26卷 / 02期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Market structure; Industrial organization; Storable goods; Commitment; Game theory; Vertical integration; MARKET-STRUCTURE; PRICING BEHAVIOR; MONOPOLY; SALES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econmod.2008.08.008
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The role of commitment under monopoly for storable goods has been fully considered in many papers. In general, if the monopolist with storable goods cannot commit, the prices are higher than in the case in which the monopolist launches commitment. According to the discrete-time dynamic model, commitment for storable goods under vertically integrated structures is considered in this paper. The similar results to the monopoly are correspondingly obtained. Namely, the prices without commitment are also higher than that with commitment under vertical integration. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：414 / 417
页数：4
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