Corporate Governance and Firm-specific Stock Price Crashes

被引:200
|
作者
Andreou, Panayiotis C. [1 ,2 ]
Antoniou, Constantinos [3 ]
Horton, Joanne [4 ]
Louca, Christodoulos [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Cyprus Univ Technol, Dept Commerce Finance & Shipping, 115 Spyrou Araouzou St, CY-3036 Lemesos, Cyprus
[2] Univ Durham, Sch Business, Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, England
[3] Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[4] Univ Exeter, Sch Business, Rennes Dr, Exeter EX4 4PU, Devon, England
关键词
crash risk; corporate governance; agency risk; information environment; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; CEO COMPENSATION; MARKET VALUATION; AUDIT COMMITTEE; PERFORMANCE; BOARD; BEHAVIOR; CONSERVATISM;
D O I
10.1111/eufm.12084
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate whether ownership structure, accounting opacity, board structure & processes and managerial incentives attributes relate to future stock price crash risk. Principal component analysis on the 21 attributes that comprise these four corporate governance dimensions reveals that they can explain between 13.1% and 23.0% of a one standard deviation in crash risk. Transient institutional ownership, CEO stock option incentives and the proportion of directors that hold equity increase crash risk, whilst insiders' ownership, accounting conservatism, board size and the presence of a corporate governance policy mitigate crash risk. Overall these relationships are more pronounced in environments that accentuate agency risk.
引用
收藏
页码:916 / 956
页数:41
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