The Politics of Local Justice Expenditure in China

This paper analyzes how justice expenditure-spending on public order and safety-in Chinese counties is affected by local and national political factors. Despite the central government's apparent concern over social order and stability, under the institutional framework of weak downward accountability and limited upward accountability local leaders are not incentivized to respond effectively to either public demand or national imperatives for public order and safety. Confirming the influence of local leaders' political career incentives, a panel data regression analysis on a comprehensive county-level data set for the years from 1997 through 2002 suggests that the share of justice spending reaches the lowest point during a chief executive's third year in office and a party secretary's fourth year in office. In contrast, national political factors, such as the centrally mandated anti-crime campaigns or the nationally designated minority or poor counties, have no consistent effect on and could even depress local justice spending.