Firm heterogeneity in growth option value: The role of managerial incentives

被引:35
|
作者
Alessandri, Todd M. [1 ]
Tong, Tony W. [2 ]
Reuer, Jeffrey J. [3 ]
机构
[1] Northeastern Univ, Coll Business Adm, Boston, MA 02115 USA
[2] Univ Colorado, Leeds Sch Business, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
[3] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
关键词
real options theory; growth option value; managerial incentives; firm heterogeneity; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; COMPENSATION DESIGN; JOINT VENTURES; DOWNSIDE RISK; REAL OPTIONS; PANEL-DATA; INVESTMENT; PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1002/smj.1992
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Growth option value varies widely across firms. This research explores managerial incentives as a source of firm heterogeneity in growth option value. We argue that when the payoff structure of managerial incentives corresponds to that of growth options, managers will be motivated to pursue actions that increase firms' growth option value, particularly when greater growth opportunities are available in an industry. Results indicate that stock option holdings and managerial stock ownership have a positive effect on growth option value, while short-term pay has a negative effect. We also find support for a positive interaction effect between equity-based managerial incentives and industry growth opportunities on growth option value. These findings highlight the critical role of managerial incentives in affecting firms' realization of growth option value. Copyright (C) 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:1557 / 1566
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Managerial overconfidence, CSR and firm value
    Gao, Yu
    Han, Kil-Seok
    ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2022, 29 (06) : 1600 - 1618
  • [22] Hedging, managerial ownership and firm value
    Zamzamir, Zaminor
    Haron, Razali
    Othman, Anwar Hasan Abdullah
    JOURNAL OF ASIAN BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2021, 28 (04): : 263 - 280
  • [23] Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value
    Fahlenbrach, Ruediger
    Stulz, Rene M.
    JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 92 (03) : 342 - 361
  • [24] The role of managerial incentives in bank acquisitions
    Hadlock, C
    Houston, J
    Ryngaert, M
    JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 1999, 23 (2-4) : 221 - 249
  • [25] IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL ON FIRM'S VALUE: THE MODERATING ROLE OF MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP
    Ahmed, Aftab
    Khurshid, Muhammad Kashif
    Zulfiqar, Muhammad
    Yousaf, Muhammad Usman
    SMART-JOURNAL OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT STUDIES, 2019, 15 (02) : 28 - 37
  • [26] Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover
    Anderson, Ronald W.
    Bustamante, M. Cecilia
    Guibaud, Stephane
    Zervos, Mihail
    JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2018, 73 (01): : 419 - 464
  • [27] Reexamining the managerial ownership effect on firm value
    Benson, Bradley W.
    Davidson, Wallace N., III
    JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2009, 15 (05) : 573 - 586
  • [28] Managerial shareholdings, firm value, and acquired corporations
    Halpern, Paul
    Kieschnick, Robert
    Rotenberg, Wendy
    QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, 2005, 45 (4-5): : 781 - 795
  • [29] Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Value: A Dynamic Perspective
    Chang, Xin
    Zhang, Hong Feng
    JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 2015, 50 (05) : 1083 - 1103
  • [30] Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment
    Faleye, Olubunmi
    JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2007, 83 (02) : 501 - 529