A note on ex-ante stable lotteries

被引：3
|
作者：
Schlegel, Jan Christoph [1 ]
机构：
[1] City Univ London, Dept Econ, London, England
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2018年 / 164卷
基金：
瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词：
Matching; School choice; Lotteries; Ex-ante stability; SCHOOL-CHOICE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.017
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability, one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：90 / 93
页数：4
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