The dynamics of voting ownership in lone-founder, family-founder, and heir firms

被引:14
|
作者
Achleitner, Ann-Kristin [1 ]
Kaserer, Christoph [1 ]
Kauf, Tobias [1 ]
机构
[1] Tech Univ Munich, TUM Sch Management, CEFS, D-80333 Munich, Germany
关键词
Ownership dynamics; Individual blockholder; Lone-founder firm; Family-founder firm; Heir firm; Corporate governance; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; STEWARDSHIP THEORY; IDENTITY THEORY; AGENCY COSTS; PERFORMANCE; GOVERNANCE; BEHAVIOR; LINK;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.02.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine ownership dynamics in listed founding-family firms over the period 1996-2008. In order to enlarge the understanding of persistence of ownership influence, we analyze determinants of change in the light of family-firm heterogeneity. We detect ownership decreases and increases, alike. A Large Drop of ownership (at least -25%) occurs 4 times as often as a Large Increase. The mean negative change is -3.1% (median 0.0%), positive changes average 0.6% (median 0.0%). Foremost, owner identity characteristics and management board participation of individual blockholders explain the likelihood of ownership dynamics. Specifically, Lone Founder Firms show the most dynamical ownership structures in all regression scenarios. Heir Firms have the most robust ownership structure and are - on average - majority controlled by a family. They are less likely to reduce their ownership influence. Family Founder Firms are only changing ownership when the family forgoes to comply with the blocking minority of 25% plus one share further. We interpret all results in the light of identity, agency, stewardship, and financial theory. Thereby, an unbalanced panel (2529 firm years) of founding-family firms listed in the German CDAX market index at Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) represents the empirical foundation. (c) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:79 / 96
页数:18
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