Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?

被引：316

作者：

Bizjak, John M. ^{[1
]}

Lemmon, Michael L. ^{[2
]}

Naveen, Lalitha ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Portland State Univ, Portland, OR 97207 USA

[2] Univ Utah, David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA

[3] Temple Univ, Fox Sch Business, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2008年 / 90卷 / 02期

关键词：

Executive compensation; Benchmarking; CEO pay;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.007

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects chief executive officer (CEO) pay. We find that the use of benchmarking is widespread and has a significant impact on CEO compensation. One view is that benchmarking is inefficient because it can lead to increases in executive pay not tied to firm performance. A contrasting view is that benchmarking is a practical and efficient mechanism used to gauge the market wage necessary to retain valuable human capital. Our empirical results generally support the latter view. Our findings also suggest that the documented asymmetry in the relationship between CEO pay and luck is explained by the firm's desire to adjust pay for retention purposes and is not the result of rent-seeking behavior oil the part of the CEO. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：152 / 168

页数：17