Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case

被引：0
|
作者：
Ramaekers, Eve [1 ]
机构：
[1] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, Charge Rech FRS FNRS, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium
来源：
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2013年 / 41卷 / 02期
关键词：
INTERMEDIATE PREFERENCES; ENVY-FREENESS; DIVISION; PEOPLE;
D O I：
10.1007/s00355-012-0684-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
One must allocate a finite set of indivisible goods among two agents without monetary compensation. We impose Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, a weak notion of no-envy, a welfare lower bound based on each agent's ranking of the subsets of goods, and a monotonicity property w.r.t. changes in preferences. We prove that there is a rule satisfying these axioms. If there are three goods, it is the only rule, together with one of its subcorrespondences, satisfying each fairness axiom and not discriminating between goods.
引用
收藏
页码：359 / 380
页数：22
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] An Approximation Alaorithm for Max-Min Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
    Asadpour, Arash
    Saberi, Amin
    STOC 07: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 39TH ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING, 2007, : 114 - 121
  • [22] Market allocation of indivisible goods
    Ichiishi, T
    Idzik, A
    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1999, 32 (04) : 457 - 466
  • [23] QUEUE ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE GOODS
    SVENSSON, LG
    SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 1994, 11 (04) : 323 - 330
  • [24] An Allocation Algorithm of Indivisible Goods
    Shimizu, Kohei
    Manabe, Yoshifumi
    2015 10th Asia-Pacific Symposium on Information and Telecommunication Technologies (APSITT), 2015,
  • [25] On Fair and Efficient Allocations of Indivisible Goods
    Murhekar, Aniket
    Garg, Jugal
    THIRTY-FIFTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE ELEVENTH SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2021, 35 : 5595 - 5602
  • [26] Worst case compromises in matroids with applications to the allocation of indivisible goods
    Gourves, Laurent
    Monnot, Jerome
    Tlilane, Lydia
    THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE, 2015, 589 : 121 - 140
  • [27] Scoring Rules for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods
    Baumeister, Dorothea
    Bouveret, Sylvain
    Lang, Jerome
    Nhan-Tam Nguyen
    Trung Thanh Nguyen
    Rothe, Joerg
    21ST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (ECAI 2014), 2014, 263 : 75 - +
  • [28] Fair Division of Indivisible Goods under Risk
    Lumet, Charles
    Bouveret, Sylvain
    Lemaitre, Michel
    20TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (ECAI 2012), 2012, 242 : 564 - +
  • [29] Duplication monotonicity in the allocation of indivisible goods
    Kuckuck, Benno
    Rothe, Joerg
    AI COMMUNICATIONS, 2019, 32 (04) : 253 - 270
  • [30] Group Fairness for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods
    Conitzer, Vincent
    Freeman, Rupert
    Shah, Nisarg
    Vaughan, Jennifer Wortman
    THIRTY-THIRD AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE / THIRTY-FIRST INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE / NINTH AAAI SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2019, : 1853 - 1860
12345