The efficient allocation of consumption under moral hazard and hidden access to the credit market

被引：0
|
作者：
Abrahám, A [1 ]
Pavoni, N
机构：
[1] Duke Univ, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[2] UCL, London, England
[3] Inst Fiscal Studies, London, England
来源：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION | 2005年 / 3卷 / 2-3期
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper, we describe the properties of the optimal allocation of consumption in a world with moral hazard and hidden borrowing and lending. We discuss how and under what conditions the efficient allocation can be distinguished from that of the permanent income (self-insurance) model. We also compare our allocation with the complete markets (full information) case, and with the standard moral hazard model with monitorable and fully contractible asset holdings.
引用
收藏
页码：370 / 381
页数：12
相关论文
共 18 条
  • [1] CREDIT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH BANK MONITORING AND MORAL HAZARD
    BESANKO, D
    KANATAS, G
    REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1993, 6 (01): : 213 - 232
  • [2] REPEATED MORAL HAZARD - THE ROLE OF MEMORY, COMMITMENT, AND THE ACCESS TO CREDIT MARKETS
    CHIAPPORI, PA
    MACHO, I
    REY, P
    SALANIE, B
    EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1994, 38 (08) : 1527 - 1553
  • [3] MORAL HAZARD AND SECURED LENDING IN AN INFINITELY REPEATED CREDIT MARKET GAME
    BOOT, AWA
    THAKOR, AV
    INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1994, 35 (04) : 899 - 920
  • [4] Efficient allocations with moral hazard and hidden borrowing and lending: A recursive formulation
    Abraham, Arpad
    Pavoni, Nicola
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, 2008, 11 (04) : 781 - 803
  • [5] Dispersed initial ownership and the efficiency of the stock market under moral hazard
    Calcagno, R
    Wagner, W
    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 42 (01) : 36 - 45
  • [6] Impact of Index Insurance on Moral Hazard in the Agricultural Credit Market: Theory and Evidence from Ghana
    Dougherty, John P.
    Gallenstein, Richard A.
    Mishra, Khushbu
    JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES, 2021, 30 (05) : 418 - 446
  • [7] Regulating nitrogen pollution with risk averse farmers under hidden information and moral hazard
    Bontems, P
    Thomas, A
    AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 88 (01) : 57 - 72
  • [8] Efficient resource allocation in wireless network virtualization: A joint design of adverse selection and moral hazard
    Guo, Chuyi
    Zhang, Yanru
    Wang, Li
    Han, Zhu
    Zhang, Ping
    2017 IEEE/CIC INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS IN CHINA (ICCC), 2017, : 298 - 303
  • [9] Distinguishing moral hazard from access for high-cost healthcare under insurance
    Robertson, Christopher T.
    Yuan, Andy
    Zhang, Wendan
    Joiner, Keith
    PLOS ONE, 2020, 15 (04):
  • [10] OPTIMAL ASSETS ALLOCATION FOR RISK AVERSE INVESTOR UNDER MARKET RISKS AND CREDIT RISK
    Rizal, Nora Amelda
    Wiryono, Sudarso Kaderi
    Prasetyo, Ahmad Danu
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND SOCIETY, 2018, 19 (01): : 245 - 258
12