Voluntary Disclosure and Analyst Forecast

被引：9
|
作者：
Lang, Konrad [1 ]
机构：
[1] Eberhard Karls Univ Tubingen, Dept Managerial Accounting, Nauklerstr 47, D-72074 Tubingen, Germany
来源：
EUROPEAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2018年 / 27卷 / 01期
关键词：
MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS; BAD-NEWS; DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE; SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION; PRICE CHANGES; INFORMATION; MARKET; EXPECTATIONS; FIRMS; GUIDANCE;
D O I：
10.1080/09638180.2016.1217783
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Empiricists document that firms more often voluntarily disclose bad news than good news and link this pessimism to managers' increased incentives not to fall short of earnings expectations. This paper analyzes the voluntary disclosure of a manager's private information by explicitly considering her incentives to meet or beat an analyst's earnings forecast. The model predicts that managers who face strong incentives to meet or beat these forecasts more frequently disclose bad news than good news in order to guide analysts' expectations about future earnings downward. This pessimism is higher in markets with less informed managers and may hold even if the manager has strong incentives for high stock prices and meet-or-beat incentives are comparably low.
引用
收藏
页码：23 / 36
页数：14
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