Recruit Screening, Representation, and the Moral Hazard Problem in Policing

Calls for more representative police forces, made regularly over the past four decades, rest in part on the assumption that hiring minority officers will help departments overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problems that lead to overly aggressive and discriminatory policing. However, the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between force representativeness and improved policing outcomes has been remarkably mixed. This article explores the effectiveness of another method that departments can use to overcome those same problems, as well as the degree to which those methods may interact with the demographic composition of police departments. Results from a difference-in-differences analysis of more than 500 police departments in 2002 and 2008 suggest that screening recruits for conflict management skills reduces racial disproportion in discretionary arrests, particularly in departments that are more representative of the communities they serve. The analyses also suggest that conflict management screening, when combined with recruit screening for sensitivity to diverse cultures, reduces the lethal use of force by police.