Crime and moral hazard: Does more policing necessarily induce private negligence?

被引：5

作者：

Guha, Brishti ^{[1
]}

Guha, Ashok S. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Singapore Management Univ, Dept Econ, Singapore 178903, Singapore

[2] Jawaharlal Nehru Univ, Sch Int Studies, New Delhi 110067, India

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2012年 / 115卷 / 03期

关键词：

Crime; Policing; Private precautions; Moral hazard; Diversification; OPTIMAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT; ORGANIZED-CRIME; DETERRENCE; INCENTIVES; ECONOMICS; VICTIM; SIZE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.105

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases and even when one of these options is infeasible - greater policing often actually encourages private precautions. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：455 / 459

页数：5

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