机构:
Chuo Univ, Fac Commerce, 742-1 Higashi Nakano, Hachioji, Tokyo 1920393, JapanChuo Univ, Fac Commerce, 742-1 Higashi Nakano, Hachioji, Tokyo 1920393, Japan
Nemoto, Tadanobu
[1
]
Ogura, Yoshiaki
论文数: 0引用数: 0
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机构:
Waseda Univ, Sch Polit Sci & Econ, Shinjuku Ku, 1-6-1 Nishi Waseda, Tokyo 1698050, JapanChuo Univ, Fac Commerce, 742-1 Higashi Nakano, Hachioji, Tokyo 1920393, Japan
Ogura, Yoshiaki
[2
]
Watanabe, Wako
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Keio Univ, Fac Business & Commerce, Minato Ku, 2-15-45 Mita, Tokyo 1088345, JapanChuo Univ, Fac Commerce, 742-1 Higashi Nakano, Hachioji, Tokyo 1920393, Japan
Watanabe, Wako
[3
]
机构:
[1] Chuo Univ, Fac Commerce, 742-1 Higashi Nakano, Hachioji, Tokyo 1920393, Japan
[2] Waseda Univ, Sch Polit Sci & Econ, Shinjuku Ku, 1-6-1 Nishi Waseda, Tokyo 1698050, Japan
[3] Keio Univ, Fac Business & Commerce, Minato Ku, 2-15-45 Mita, Tokyo 1088345, Japan
This paper estimates inside bank premiums arising from relationship banking and identifies the primary mechanism causing them among competing extant theories. Our empirical results using a dataset that is primarily based on a survey that we designed show that inside bank premiums are economically significant with an average of 68-71 basis points for short-term loans. The subsample regressions show that these premiums are more likely to result from the provision of implicit insurance or flexibility in renegotiation by the inside bank and that they are more significant for firms whose inside banks are larger, those with a lower capital to asset ratio, or those in more concentrated loan markets. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机构:
Mitsubishi Corp, Thermal Coal Business Unit, Ferrous Raw Mat Div, Setagaya Ku, Tokyo 1540002, JapanWesleyan Univ, Dept Econ, Middletown, CT 06459 USA