Fiscal federalism and the composition of public investment in Europe

被引:66
|
作者
Kappeler, Andreas [2 ]
Vaelilae, Timo [1 ]
机构
[1] European Investment Bank, Econ & Financial Studies Div, L-2950 Luxembourg, Luxembourg
[2] Univ Munich, Munich Grad Sch Econ, D-80539 Munich, Germany
关键词
public investment; fiscal federalism; dynamic panel data;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.06.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyse the determinants of the composition of public investment in Europe, with a special focus On the role of fiscal decentralisation. The results suggest that fiscal decentralisation boosts economically productive public investment, notably infrastructure, and curbs the relative share of economically less productive investment, such as recreational facilities. While not readily reconcilable with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism, these findings can be interpreted in terms of the literature on fiscal competition, with not only tax rates but also the quality of public expenditure weighing in firms' location decisions. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:562 / 570
页数:9
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