On Pure Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games

被引:1
|
作者
Das, Ankush [1 ]
Krishna, Shankara Narayanan [1 ]
Manasa, Lakshmi [1 ]
Trivedi, Ashutosh [1 ]
Wojtczak, Dominik [2 ]
机构
[1] Indian Inst Technol, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India
[2] Univ Liverpool, Dept Comp Sci, Liverpool, Merseyside, England
来源
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS OF MODELS OF COMPUTATION (TAMC 2015) | 2015年 / 9076卷
基金
英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;
关键词
Stochastic games; Nash equilibrium; Pure strategy; Finite-state strategy; COMPLEXITY;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-319-17142-5_31
中图分类号
TP31 [计算机软件];
学科分类号
081202 ; 0835 ;
摘要
Ummels and Wojtczak initiated the study of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multi-player games satisfying specific bounds. They showed that deciding the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (pureNE) where a fixed player wins almost surely is undecidable for games with 9 players. They also showed that the problem remains undecidable for the finite-strategy Nash equilibrium (finNE) with 14 players. In this paper we improve their undecidability results by showing that pureNE and finNE problems remain undecidable for 5 or more players.
引用
收藏
页码:359 / 371
页数:13
相关论文
共 50 条