Social norms and tax compliance: Framing the decision to pay tax

被引:34
|
作者
Cullis, John [1 ]
Jones, Philip [1 ]
Savoia, Antonio [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bath, Dept Econ, Bath BA2 7AY, Avon, England
[2] Univ Manchester, Inst Dev Policy & Management, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
[3] Univ Salerno, Salerno, Italy
来源
JOURNAL OF SOCIO-ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 41卷 / 02期
关键词
Taxation; Decision making; Prospect theory; National identity: education; EVASION; REDISTRIBUTION;
D O I
10.1016/j.socec.2011.12.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Observed levels of tax compliance are higher than predicted levels (when predictions are based on Allingham and Sandmo's neoclassical model of tax evasion). They are higher if social norms recognise the importance of compliance. But how do social norms frame decisions to pay tax? Can prospect theory be applied to shed insight into the way that social norms exert their influence? An analysis of questionnaire responses (from Italy and from the UK) suggests that they exert their influence by changing the reference points that individuals use when they code changes as 'gains', or 'losses'. The evidence suggests that social norms frame the decision to pay tax by changing individuals' perceptions of their entitlement to income. This consideration is important when designing policy to deter evasion. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:159 / 168
页数:10
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