Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-causal, Compatibilist Account.

被引：0

作者：

Alvarez, Maria ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Kings Coll London, London, England

来源：

ETHICS | 2017年 / 127卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/691576

中图分类号：

B82 [伦理学（道德学）];

学科分类号：

摘要：

引用

页码：958 / 963

页数：6

共 50 条

[21] Are Identities Unexplainable? Towards a Non-causal Contrastive Explanation of Identities
Azzano, Lorenzo
Carrara, Massimiliano
THEORIA-A SWEDISH JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 2021, 87 (02): : 457 - 482
[22] The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics
Alexander Reutlinger
Mark Colyvan
Karolina Krzyżanowska
Erkenntnis, 2022, 87 : 1773 - 1793
[23] Hempel's Standard Examples of Non-causal Explanation in the Light of Skow's Theory of Causal Explanation
Makovnik, Dalibor
FILOZOFIA, 2022, 77 (05): : 311 - 324
[24] The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics
Reutlinger, Alexander
Colyvan, Mark
Krzyzanowska, Karolina
ERKENNTNIS, 2022, 87 (04) : 1773 - 1793
[25] A pluralist account of non-causal explanation in science and mathematicsMarc Lange: Because without cause: Non-causal explanation in science and mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, xxii+489pp, $74.00 HB
Juha Saatsi
Metascience, 2018, 27 (1) : 3 - 9
[26] Does the counterfactual theory of explanation apply to non-causal explanations in metaphysics?
Reutlinger, Alexander
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 2017, 7 (02) : 239 - 256
[27] Non-causal Explanation: Hempel's Legacy and its Modern Versions
Makovnik, Dalibor
FILOZOFIA, 2021, 76 (10): : 752 - 765
[28] Models, robustness, and non-causal explanation: a foray into cognitive science and biology
Irvine, Elizabeth
SYNTHESE, 2015, 192 (12) : 3943 - 3959
[29] Models, robustness, and non-causal explanation: a foray into cognitive science and biology
Elizabeth Irvine
Synthese, 2015, 192 : 3943 - 3959
[30] Does the counterfactual theory of explanation apply to non-causal explanations in metaphysics?
Alexander Reutlinger
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2017, 7 : 239 - 256

← 1 2 3 4 5 →