Fiscal Decentralization: guilty of aggravating corruption in China?

The relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption is highly controversial but insufficiently tested with respect to China. This article empirically tests whether fiscal decentralization aggravates corruption in China's local governments. To acquire more robust results, we employ multiple corruption and fiscal decentralization measures and collect data for 31 provinces from 1998 to 2008. Fixed effects panel models estimate the impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption after controlling for gross regional product per capita, the relative wage in the public sector compared to the private sector, political leadership changes, education levels, law enforcement and the number of NGOs. Our findings suggest that China has experienced a trend towards fiscal recentralization rather than decentralization in the 2000s. We also find the moderating effect of the level of law enforcement on corruption: fiscal decentralization in local governments with strong law enforcement deters corruption but the opposite relationship is found when their law enforcement is weak. The implication of our research is that a sound legal system and political will are prerequisites for successful fiscal decentralization.