Convergence of the iterated prisoner's dilemma game

被引:8
|
作者
Dyer, M [1 ]
Goldberg, LA
Greenhill, C
Istrate, G
Jerrum, M
机构
[1] Univ Leeds, Sch Comp, Leeds LS2 9JT, W Yorkshire, England
[2] Univ Warwick, Dept Comp Sci, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[3] Univ Melbourne, Dept Math & Stat, Parkville, Vic 3502, Australia
[4] Los Alamos Natl Lab, Ctr Nonlinear Studies, Los Alamos, NM 87545 USA
[5] Los Alamos Natl Lab, Div CIC3, Los Alamos, NM 87545 USA
[6] Univ Edinburgh, Sch Comp Sci, Edinburgh EH9 3JZ, Midlothian, Scotland
来源
COMBINATORICS PROBABILITY & COMPUTING | 2002年 / 11卷 / 02期
关键词
Computational complexity - Convergence of numerical methods - Graph theory - Iterative methods - Markov processes - Polynomials - State space methods - Theorem proving;
D O I
10.1017/S096354830100503X
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
We consider a stochastic process based on the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. During the game, each of n players has a state, either cooperate or defect. The players are connected by an 'interaction graph', During each step of the process, an edge of the graph is chosen uniformly at random and the states of the players connected by the edge are modified according to the Pavlov strategy. The process converges to a unique absorbing state in which all players cooperate. We prove two conjectures of Kittock: the convergence rate is exponential in n when the interaction graph is a complete graph, and it is polynomial in n when the interaction graph is a cycle. In fact, we show that the rate is O(n log n) in the latter case.
引用
收藏
页码:135 / 147
页数:13
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