AgBIS: A Blockchain-enabled Crop Insurance Platform Against Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Insurance Frauds

被引:0
|
作者
Liao, Zhonghao [1 ]
Lu, Chaoqun [2 ]
Wright, Mark Mba [3 ]
Feng, Hongli [4 ]
Guan, Yong [1 ]
机构
[1] Iowa State Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Ames, IA 50011 USA
[2] Iowa State Univ, Dept Ecol Evolut & Organismal Biol, Ames, IA USA
[3] Iowa State Univ, Dept Mech Engn, Ames, IA USA
[4] Iowa State Univ, Dept Econ, Ames, IA USA
关键词
Terms Blockchain; Crop Insurance; Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Frauds; Oracle; Physical Unclonable Function; COST;
D O I
10.1109/Blockchain60715.2023.00024
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
Crop insurance is widely adopted to help farmers stabilize incomes and mitigate uncertainties. However, current crop insurance systems face significant challenges, including adverse selection, moral hazard, and insurance frauds, further exacerbating the difficulties associated with cost, program sustainability, and market failures. This paper dives into the subsidized multi -peril crop insurance programs and proposes AgBIS, a blockchain-enabled crop insurance platform, to mitigate the problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, and insurance frauds within crop insurance ecosystems. We conduct a systematic study on risk factors and the negative effects of those problems and identify information asymmetry as the main cause of the above problems. AgBIS aims to reconstruct the crop insurance system by facilitating transparency, efficiency, and interoperability among stakeholders. Additionally, AgBIS integrates a trustworthy hardware oracle to provide participants with highly reliable and authentic crop-related data, thus reducing information asymmetry and enhancing program sustainability.
引用
收藏
页码:92 / 99
页数:8
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