Resilient distributed economic dispatch of smart grids under deception attacks

The deepening integration of distributed energy resources in smart grids catalyzes the development of distributed energy management methods owing to their superiorities in flexibility, scalability, and robustness against single-point failures. Nevertheless, the reliance on localized implementation of distributed methods increases the susceptibility to malicious attacks. This paper focuses on the economic dispatch of smart grids under deception attacks which can artificially tamper with the information among the communication network. We investigate and reveal how such attacks deteriorate the results of optimal power generation schedule. Then, an easy-to-implement defense strategy based on the extreme values discarding technique is developed to realize resilient energy management. It is shown that under a 2R+1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2R+1$$\end{document}-robustness assumption on communication networks, the proposed method is resilient to R-local deception attacks. Compared with existing works, the benefits of the defense strategy include no restricted form of deception attacks and no isolation of attacked nodes. Finally, simulation examples verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.