Can common institutional ownership inhibit corporate over-financialization? Evidence from China

被引:1
|
作者
Ding, Hao [1 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Normal Univ, Nanjing, Peoples R China
关键词
Common institutional ownership; Corporate over-financialization; Internal control quality; Financial flexibility; CROSS-OWNERSHIP; INVESTMENT; GOVERNANCE; CONSTRAINTS;
D O I
10.1108/MF-10-2023-0677
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
PurposeCommon institutional ownership is a phenomenon that has extended throughout the capital markets in recent years and has a significant impact on business strategy decisions. The study intends to investigate the effect of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization and potential functioning mechanisms.Design/methodology/approachUsing panel data from Chinese-listed companies over the period of 2003-2021, the authors conduct regression models which controlled year-, industry- and regional fixed effects to explore the impact of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization.FindingsThis study concludes that corporate over-financialization may be prevented via common institutional ownership. The mechanism test suggests that common institutional ownership inhibits corporate over-financialization by improving internal control quality and enhancing financial flexibility. Besides, heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibiting effect of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization is more pronounced in stability-oriented institutional investors and high financing constraints firms.Originality/valueThis paper makes a valuable contribution to the current studies on effective strategies to prevent enterprises from becoming overly financialized by recognizing common institutional ownership. Furthermore, this paper adds to the research on common institutional ownership's economic consequences. Finally, this study provides management implications for how to optimize corporate governance structures, curb the financialization of entities in practice and promote the development of the real economy.
引用
收藏
页码:1291 / 1308
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Common institutional ownership and the cost of equity capital: evidence from China
    Ma, Huanyu
    Zhang, Man
    Luo, Zimeng
    MANAGERIAL FINANCE, 2025,
  • [22] Does institutional ownership affect corporate social responsibility? Evidence from China
    Zhou, Taiyun
    Liu, Mingxuan
    Zhang, Xiyu
    Qi, Zheng
    Qin, Ni
    ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY, 2024, 81 : 84 - 98
  • [23] Corporate governance, institutional ownership, and stock liquidity of SMEs: evidence from China
    Liu, Wei
    Suzuki, Yoshihisa
    ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2024,
  • [24] Institutional development, state ownership, and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China
    Kusnadi, Yuanto
    Yang, Zhifeng
    Zhou, Yuxiao
    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH, 2015, 68 (02) : 351 - 359
  • [25] Common institutional ownership and corporate misconduct
    Wang, Ziwei
    Wang, Chunfeng
    Fang, Zhenming
    MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, 2023, 44 (01) : 102 - 136
  • [26] Political turnover and corporate financialization: Evidence from China
    Lyu, Simeng
    Qi, Yong
    Yang, Shuo
    Dong, Shaoyu
    FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY, 2022, 13
  • [27] Corporate financialization and investment efficiency: Evidence from China
    Gong, Cynthia M.
    Gong, Pu
    Jiang, Mengting
    PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2023, 79
  • [28] Venture capital and corporate financialization: Evidence from China
    Xie, Hongji
    Tian, Cunzhi
    Pang, Fangying
    QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, 2024, 93 : 119 - 136
  • [29] Corporate financialization and digital transformation: evidence from China
    Chen, Xiangfen
    Cao, Yuhua
    Cao, Qilong
    Li, Jinglei
    Ju, Meng
    Zhang, Hongru
    APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2024, 56 (57) : 7876 - 7891
  • [30] Managerial myopia and corporate financialization: Evidence from China
    Zhang, Cheng
    Liu, Cheng
    Ma, Yaoying
    Yang, Chunhong
    JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, 2025, 36 (01) : 184 - 214