debt service;
sovereign debt;
human rights;
risk management;
physical integrity rights;
HUMAN-RIGHTS;
POLITICAL SURVIVAL;
STATE INCENTIVES;
DEBT;
CAPACITY;
SUBSTITUTION;
DETERRENCE;
ESCALATION;
ECONOMY;
BANK;
D O I:
10.3390/socsci12030121
中图分类号:
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号:
03 ;
0303 ;
摘要:
Sovereign default has myriad economic and political consequences. Existing research, however, has not explored the human costs of sovereign default, though some link the fiscal flexibility afforded by sovereign creditworthiness to improved human rights performance. But what are the consequences when sovereigns lose all creditworthiness and default on their debt obligations? I argue that while the average effect of default is negative for respect for physical integrity rights, a conditional effect exists. When states devote more of their resources to debt service and default, they are likely to see a short term increase in respect for physical integrity rights. I find robust support for these arguments using panel data on over 90 developing countries from 1981-2010.
机构:
Bank Korea, 39 Namdaemun Ro, Seoul 04531, South KoreaBank Korea, 39 Namdaemun Ro, Seoul 04531, South Korea
Jeon, Kiyoung
Kabukcuoglu, Zeynep
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h-index: 0
机构:
Villanova Univ, Dept Econ, Villanova Sch Business, 1007 Bartley,800 E Lancaster Ave, Villanova, PA 19085 USABank Korea, 39 Namdaemun Ro, Seoul 04531, South Korea
机构:
Inter Amer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USAInter Amer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USA
Ayres, Joao
Navarro, Gaston
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机构:
Fed Reserve Board, Washington, DC USAInter Amer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USA
Navarro, Gaston
Nicolini, Juan Pablo
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机构:
Fed Reserve Bank Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN 55480 USAInter Amer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USA
Nicolini, Juan Pablo
Teles, Pedro
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机构:
Univ Tella, Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina
Banco Portugal, Lisbon, Portugal
Catolica Lisbon Sch Business & Econ, Lisbon, Portugal
CEPR, London, EnglandInter Amer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USA