EVOLUTIONARY GAME ANALYSIS OF PRODUCT QUALITY SUPERVISION OF LIVE-STREAMING MARKETING BASED ON PROSPECT THEORY

In order to improve the quality of live-streaming products, the evolutionary game model of live streaming host and platform is built. Considering the limited rationality of the decision makers an attempt is made to introduce the prospect theory and analyze the stable state of the evolutionary game and the influence of game-related parameters on the evolution stability strategy through numerical simulation. The results indicate that (1) The risk sensitivity coefficient and the loss aversion coefficient are important influencing factors affecting the live-streaming hosts and platforms. (2) When the government penalty increases, the live-streaming platforms tend to exert stronger supervision and the live-streaming hosts with low loss aversion continue to not strict select products. The live-streaming hosts with high loss aversion opt for strict products selection. (3) When customer dissatisfaction increases or government penalties increase, the live-streaming hosts will tend to strict select products. The live streaming platforms with low loss aversion will continue to weak supervision. The live-streaming platforms with high loss aversion will choose strong supervision. Finally, we provided countermeasures and suggestions for the quality supervision in live-streaming marketing.