An Incentive-Compatible Mechanism for Decentralized Storage Network

被引:6
|
作者
Vakilinia, Iman [1 ]
Wang, Weihong [2 ]
Xin, Jiajun [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ North Florida, Sch Comp, Jacksonville, FL 32224 USA
[2] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
Blockchain; decentralized storage network; mechanism design; smart contract; PROOFS;
D O I
10.1109/TNSE.2023.3245326
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
The dominance of a few big companies in the storage market arising various concerns including single point of failure, privacy violation, and oligopoly. To eliminate the dependency on such a centralized storage architecture, several Decentralized Storage Network (DSN) schemes such as Filecoin, Sia, and Storj have been introduced. DSNs leverage blockchain technology to create a storage platform such that the micro storage providers can also participate in the storage market. To verify the accurate data storage by the storage providers during a storage contract, DSNs apply a Proof of Storage (PoS) scheme to continuously inspect the storage service. However, continuous verification of the storage provider imposes an extra cost to the network and therefore end-users. Moreover, DSN's PoS verification is vulnerable to a service denying attack in which the storage provider submits valid PoS to the network while denying the service to the client. Considering the benefits and existing challenges of DSNs, this paper introduces a novel incentive-compatible DSN scheme. In this scheme, the PoS is conducted only if the client submits a challenge request. We model the storage service as a non-cooperative repeated dynamic game and set the players' payoffs such that the storage provider's dominant strategy is to honestly follow the storage contract. Our proposed mechanism leverages the smart-contract and oracle network to govern the storage agreement between the client and storage provider efficiently. Furthermore, our scheme is independent of a specific blockchain platform but can be plugged into any blockchain platform with smart-contract execution capability. As a proof of concept, we have implemented our scheme using solidity language and chainlink oracle network. The performance analysis demonstrates the applicability of our scheme. The outcome of this paper is a new incentive-compatible mechanism designed carefully for the blockchain-based DSN. The proposed mechanism utilizes different tools including game-theory, smart-contract, oracle network, and Merkle tree to improve the security and performance of storage verification in DSN.
引用
收藏
页码:2294 / 2306
页数:13
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