Does CDS trading affect risk-taking incentives in managerial compensation?*

被引:8
|
作者
Chen, Jie [1 ]
Leung, Woon Sau [2 ]
Song, Wei [3 ]
Avino, Davide [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Leeds, Leeds Univ Business Sch, Maurice Keyworth Bldg, Leeds LS2 9JT, England
[2] Cardiff Univ, Cardiff Business Sch, Aberconway Bldg, Colum Dr, Cardiff CF10 3EU, Wales
[3] Swansea Univ, Sch Management, Bay Campus,Fabian Way, Swansea SA1 8EN, Wales
[4] Univ Liverpool, Management Sch, Liverpool L69 3BX, England
关键词
Credit default swaps; Executive compensation; Risk taking; Leverage; CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS; CORPORATE; DERIVATIVES; MATURITY; CHOICE; WEALTH; COSTS; FIRM;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.01.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find that managers receive more risk-taking incentives in their compensation packages once their firms are referenced by credit default swap (CDS) trading, particularly when institutional ownership is high and when firms are in financial distress. These findings provide suggestive evidence that boards offer pay packages that encourage greater risk taking to take advantage of the reduced creditor monitoring after CDS introduction. Further, we show that the onset of CDS trading attenuates the effect of vega on leverage, consistent with the threat of exacting creditors restraining managerial risk appetite. (c) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:13
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