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Takeover deterrence with state ownership: Evidence from China
被引:3
|作者:
Su, Zhiwei
[1
]
Xue, Yi
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Macau, Fac Business Adm, Macau 999078, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Int Business & Econ, Chaoyang 100029, Beijing, Peoples R China
基金:
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词:
Deterrence;
Privatization;
State-owned enterprises;
Takeover;
PRIVATIZATION;
MANAGEMENT;
DEFENSES;
RIGHTS;
STOCK;
LAW;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106689
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This study examines the role of Chinese state ownership in deterring takeovers. We document state own-ership's reduction in firms' susceptibility to potential takeovers. Using staggered privatization of the state-owned shareholders of public firms, as shocks to the deterrent effect of the state, we find that state-owned shareholders can insulate their portfolio firms from potential takeovers. The deterrent effect of state ownership is concentrated in strategic industries and well-functioning assets, alleviating managerial short-termism.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数:15
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