The implications of deep cooperation strategy for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas

被引:3
|
作者
Hao, Weijuan [1 ]
Hu, Yuhan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sci & Technol Liaoning, Sch Sci, Anshan 114051, Peoples R China
关键词
Cooperation; Deep cooperation; Evolutionary game; Prisoner's dilemma; PROMOTES COOPERATION; ASPIRATION; REPUTATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.amc.2024.128578
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
In contemporary society, cooperation is a crucial element for individuals pursuing shared interests and attaining triumph. However, conventional cooperative evolution approaches frequently disregard the intricacies amongst individuals. In order to gain improved comprehension and refine the cooperative evolution process, we suggest a pioneering deep cooperation strategy. The strategy of deep cooperation is grounded on the conventional Prisoner's dilemma model. It highlights that individuals incur additional costs in the game to attain more benefits while also maximizing mutual social advantages. By doing so, individuals and the collective attain a win -win situation. After research, we find that the system has the following five evolutionary results: only deep cooperation strategy, pure defection strategy, deep cooperation strategy and cooperation strategy coexistence, deep cooperation strategy and defection strategy retained, and three strategies exist simultaneously. The simulation validates that the expensive deep cooperation strategy can enhance the system's resilience to defection, prompt cooperation strategy in the populace to transition their approach to garner a greater payoff, and foster a favorable atmosphere for cooperation strategy. It provides a new perspective for understanding cooperation.
引用
收藏
页数:18
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