Identification in english auctions with shill bidding

被引：0
|
作者：
Marshall, Guillermo [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ British Columbia, Sauder Sch Business, Vancouver, BC, Canada
来源：
QME-QUANTITATIVE MARKETING AND ECONOMICS | 2024年 / 22卷 / 02期
关键词：
Auctions; Partial identification; Shill bidding; eBay; RESERVE PRICES; INFERENCE; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
What can we learn from auction data when the seller submits shill bids to inflate the auction price? I study identification in an incomplete model of an English auction with shill bidding in the context of independent private values. I show that the distribution of valuations is partially identified (as is the optimal reserve price), and I provide bounds for the distribution of valuations that hold even when the seller is not engaging in shill bidding. I apply these results to a sample of eBay auctions.
引用
收藏
页码：193 / 222
页数：30
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