The Closed Market: Platform Design and the Computerization of Economics

被引:0
|
作者
Nik-Khah, Edward [1 ]
机构
[1] Roanoke Coll, Roanoke, VA 24153 USA
来源
关键词
auctions; market design; platforms; tech economics; human-ma-chine interaction; TRANSFORMATION; MECHANISM; EXCHANGE;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The platform firm has emerged as an important site for the production of economic knowledge. This paper situates the work performed by a newly christened group of "tech economists" under the auspices of these firms within a larger history of economists' engagement with information pro-cessing. Previously, those economists wishing to grapple with the computer would ally with the military, eventually leading them to accept an under-standing of markets as purpose-built, algorithmic "person-machine sys-tems." Upon allying with the platform firm, economists would attune their understanding to the business model of their new patrons. This paper con-siders what this development augurs for the profession.
引用
收藏
页码:877 / 905
页数:30
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Economics of the Labor Market
    Tolles, N. Arnold
    INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW, 1950, 3 (03): : 444 - 445
  • [42] Stock Market Economics
    Henderson, Ronald F.
    ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1955, 65 (260): : 689 - 690
  • [43] THE ECONOMICS OF THE BEESWAX MARKET
    MORSE, RA
    AMERICAN BEE JOURNAL, 1983, 123 (07): : 514 - 515
  • [44] Market failure in a new model of platform design with partially informed consumers
    Gao, Fujuan
    Fenoaltea, Enrico Maria
    Zhang, Yi-Cheng
    PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS, 2023, 619
  • [45] A Qt platform-based automatic train diagram computerization tool
    Li, Yan
    Zhao, Xing
    Zhu, Wei-wei
    INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 2015, : 87 - 90
  • [46] Who Gets What-and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design
    Eisen, Carol
    LIBRARY JOURNAL, 2015, 140 (11) : 95 - 96
  • [47] Power system economics course design with energy planning, operation and market cases
    Li, Lingtao
    Xiang, Yue
    Lu, Yu
    ENERGY REPORTS, 2023, 9 : 381 - 390
  • [48] Power system economics course design with energy planning, operation and market cases
    Li, Lingtao
    Xiang, Yue
    Lu, Yu
    ENERGY REPORTS, 2023, 9 : 381 - 390
  • [49] Design of Public Voluntary Carbon Market Mechanism based on Crosschain and Token Economics
    Hou, Dongsheng
    Hao, Yukun
    Du, Yu
    BSCI'22: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ACM INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON BLOCKCHAIN AND SECURE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, 2022, : 135 - 137
  • [50] Who Gets What-and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design
    Jaworski, Peter M.
    ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY, 2017, 33 (02) : 332 - 336