Commentary on "Dynamic Incentives in Sales Force Compensation"

被引：0
|
作者：
Kong, Xiangyin [1 ]
Cheng, Qi [1 ,2 ]
Yu, Yimin [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Sci & Technol China, Int Inst Finance, Sch Management, Hefei 230026, Anhui, Peoples R China
[2] City Univ Hong Kong, Coll Business, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源：
MARKETING SCIENCE | 2024年 / 43卷 / 01期
关键词：
sales force; compensation; sales dynamics; agency theory; differential games;
D O I：
10.1287/mksc.2021.0127
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We show that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the salesperson's problem is not correct because of the effect of a positive discount factor for the infinite-horizon risk-sensitive control. As a result, their analyses and insights are incorrect. We present the correct HJB equation for the salesperson's problem, which is a partial differential equation. Thus, further investigation on the correct solutions is needed to better understand the problem.
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页数：4
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