Detection and Mitigation of Spoofing Attacks Against Time Synchronization and Positioning

被引:5
|
作者
Lee, Junhwan [1 ]
Schmidt, Erick [1 ]
Gatsis, Nikolaos [1 ]
Akopian, David [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas San Antonio, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, San Antonio, TX 78249 USA
来源
IEEE ACCESS | 2023年 / 11卷
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing; anti-spoofing technique; time synchronization attack (TSA); position spoofing; linearized dynamic model; GPS; VULNERABILITY;
D O I
10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3341028
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers are vulnerable to intentional spoofing attacks which can manipulate position, velocity, and time (PVT) measurements. Previous work has demonstrated that Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) can be detected and mitigated using sparse optimization techniques which reveal spoofers' presence in inflicted signals' derivative domains. Aiming to provide an efficient protection algorithm against spoofing, this paper expands the scope of the sparse signal processing framework to address more complicated attacks for stationary and low-dynamic receivers. In particular, TSAs against stationary receivers should be addressed differently if the position and velocity are manipulated by the spoofer at the same time. A new sparse processing method is presented employing a novel linearization of the measurement equation that includes attacks against time, position, and velocity. The method is assessed against both authentically and synthetically spoofed signals to verify its robustness in two test beds: 1) a lab-based software defined GPS receiver; and 2) a commercial hand-held device.
引用
收藏
页码:138986 / 139003
页数:18
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