Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

被引：4

作者：

Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ^{[1
,2
]}

Dufwenberg, Martin ^{[3
,4
,5
]}

Papa, Stefano ^{[6
]}

Passarelli, Francesco ^{[5
,7
,8
,9
]}

机构：

[1] Sapienza Univ Rome, Dept Econ & Law, Rome, Italy

[2] Univ Antwerp, Dept Econ, Antwerp, Belgium

[3] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ USA

[4] Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, Gothenburg, Sweden

[5] CESifo, Munich, Germany

[6] Univ Tor Vergata, Dept Econ & Finance, Rome, Italy

[7] Univ Turin, Dept Econ Esomas, Turin, Italy

[8] Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin, Italy

[9] Bocconi Univ, Milan, Italy

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2023年 / 222卷

关键词：

Guilt aversion; Promise-keeping; Informal agreements;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110931

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals' inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：3

共 50 条

[31] LIST OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COMMITMENTS AS OF JUNE 30, 1972 - AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES IN FORCE FOR FRANCE, INCLUDING CHRONOLOGY TABLE - FRENCH - ROLLET,H
SPRUDZS, A
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1975, 69 (02) : 461 - 461
[32] Promises and conventions - An approach to pre-play agreements
Miettinen, Topi
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2013, 80 : 68 - 84
[33] Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
Ellingsen, Tore
Miettinen, Topi
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2014, 87 : 353 - 366
[34] Deontic commitments in conditional promises and threats: towards an exemplar semantics for conditionals
Sztencel, Magdalena
Clarke, Leesa
LANGUAGE AND COGNITION, 2018, 10 (03) : 435 - 466
[35] Keeping Promises? Democracies' Ability to Harmonize Their International and National Climate Commitments
Baker, Jack Kessel
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, 2023, 23 (04) : 170 - 200
[36] Pre-play promises, threats and commitments under partial credibility
Melkonyan, Tigran
Chakravarty, Surajeet
ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 2024, 62 (01) : 308 - 328
[37] RESTRICTIVE EFFECTS OF CURRENT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
不详
AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL, 1972, 76 (734): : R7 - &
[38] THE EC IN THE NETWORK OF ITS BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
EHRHARDT, CA
AUSSEN POLITIK, 1980, 31 (04): : 371 - 385
[39] Bilateral agreements to address illegal logging
Speechly, H
INTERNATIONAL FORESTRY REVIEW, 2003, 5 (03) : 219 - 229
[40] Bilateral agreements 2 Switzerland-EU and other recent agreements
Kronen, Vincent
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW, 2007, 44 (03): : 861 - 863

← 1 2 3 4 5 →