Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

被引:4
|
作者
Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni [1 ,2 ]
Dufwenberg, Martin [3 ,4 ,5 ]
Papa, Stefano [6 ]
Passarelli, Francesco [5 ,7 ,8 ,9 ]
机构
[1] Sapienza Univ Rome, Dept Econ & Law, Rome, Italy
[2] Univ Antwerp, Dept Econ, Antwerp, Belgium
[3] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ USA
[4] Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, Gothenburg, Sweden
[5] CESifo, Munich, Germany
[6] Univ Tor Vergata, Dept Econ & Finance, Rome, Italy
[7] Univ Turin, Dept Econ Esomas, Turin, Italy
[8] Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin, Italy
[9] Bocconi Univ, Milan, Italy
关键词
Guilt aversion; Promise-keeping; Informal agreements;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110931
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals' inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数:3
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